Art and Ethics in the Drama: Senecan "Pseudotragedy" Reconsidered by Motto, Anna Lydia & Clark, John R.
10
ART AND ETHICS IN THE DRAMA:
SENECAN "PSEUDOTRAGEDY" RECONSIDERED*^
ANNA LYDIA MOTTO and JOHN R. CLARK
Praeter sapientem autem nemo unum agit, cetevi
muttiformes sumus. Modo fvugi tihi videbimur et
graves, modo prodigi et vani. Mutamus subinde
personam et aontrarium ei, sumimuSj quam exuimus.
(Except for the wise man, however, no one plays
one role; the rest of us have many faces. Now we
will seem to you thrifty and serious, now extra-
vagant and idle. We continually change our per-
sona and put one on contrary to that which we have
taken off.) Seneca, Ep. 120.22
Too many critics argue that Seneca wrote his tragedies to ex-
pound his philosophic doctrines. They postulate - what has
ever been in some quarters suspected - that the plays by the
Stoic Philosopher are fundamentally Stoical. One critic
has gone so far as to propose that these "philosophical propa-
ganda-plays" constitute in fact a single "set" of tragedies
which should be studied in the sequence and order they occupy
in the Codex Etruscus, beginning and concluding with a Her-
2)
cules play. Thus the plays must be read altogether, en masse,
as a single "Stoic treatise" which may be designated "as a
sort of glorified Essay on Man." There are, she believes,
unrelieved horrors and gloom, uncontrolled passions, and an
evil fate operative throughout the series - until the reader
comes at last to the final play, the Oetaeus , where Stoic vir-
tue is finally rewarded.
This critic's overall hypothesis has been largely discounted for a
number of very good reasons. We have absolutely no evidence nor inkling
that Seneca himself "arranged" the ordering of his plays; indeed, we have
no information about their original "publication" whatsoever. Again, we
have not one iota of evidence that would lend credence to the suggestion
that the ordering of the Codex Etruscus is to be preferred to the ordering
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of A or any other recensions. In addition, the Phoenissae is admittedly
an incomplete fragment, and many critics question the authorship of the
Hercules Oetaeus.^^ Finally, until the era of Proust, no one had encounter-
ed the ennealogical structure; a Greek audience had enough to do to
sustain its attention-span when faced with the performance of a trilogy
(together with a satyr-play) ; a nine-headed monster would have overwhelmed
it. Whatever one might say to the contrary, it was never Seneca's prac-
tice to keep his readers suspended for some five hundred pages before
granting them respite - and enlightenment. As Jonathan Swift once re-
marked, "Going too long is a Cause of Abortion as effectual, tho' not so
frequent, as Going too short...." If Seneca were as eager to inculcate
philosophical doctrine as this critic appears to believe, his astonishing-
ly outstretched sequence of plays would contribute mightily to the loss of
instruction entirely. No; such a critic's conjectures sim.ply have not
been able to pass muster because they are so free-wheeling and insubstan-
tial. C. D. N. Costa, for example, finds such a theory "most unlikely;"
"it needs a good deal of special pleading to infer Stoic teaching from all
the plays. ...
Although such a conjectural thesis has been, in large measure, shunted
aside, it is important to come to terms with a beguiling and rather wide-
ly-held opinion concerning the presence of overt Stoicism in the Philoso-
pher's drama and with the popularly received notion that there is or ought
to be explicit didacticism and moral teaching in works of literature,
particularly the drama. We are told, for example, that Seneca's plays
constitute "a piece of neo-Stoic propaganda," and are primarily dedicated
8)
to "the teaching of philosophy;" hence, this critic believes that the
Senecan plays are "pseudotragedies, " utilizing dramatic form as deceptive
"sugar-coating." Accordingly, "from a purely aesthetic point of view much
9)
in [these plays] deserves the most severe strictures." Needless to say,
the very term "pseudotragedy" is pejorative, suggesting the synthetic, the
counterfeit, and the second rate. Such a critic's emphasis upon Stoicism
stems from the "effort to determine Seneca's object in writing the plays
...;" we might suggest that such criticism is guilty of "The Intention-
al Fallacy." For we can never predicate an author's intentions with
certainty, and when we then proceed to locate the effects of that postu-
lated intention in his writings, our argument becomes hopelessly circular;
such criticism, as Wimsatt observes, "... begins by trying to derive the
standard of criticism from the psychological causes of the poem and ends
12)in biography and relativism."
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It is also interesting to note that so many modern critics endorse a
kind of unwritten "law of literary specialization:" a philosopher cannot
write plays, etc. Rigidly applied, this criterion would prevent a Caesar
from writing memoirs or plays, a Plato from writing poetry, any poet from
writing criticism, any doctor, lawyer, or priest from writing fiction.
Indeed, for many a critic, it is the philosophical content in Senecan
drama that counts and that saves his plays from total condemnation. Hope-
fully, the reader at this point will be seriously dismayed to observe how
congenially such criticism sacrifices "mere aesthetic" in works of art in
favor of solid moral teaching. Certainly, as in all great literature,
Seneca's plays abound in deep thought and in psychological understanding
of human nature but one can hardly argue that he employed the tragic genre
primarily to impart philosophic concepts.
To be sure, the whole question of literature's "utility" and "moral
purpose" has been a recurrent and vexing problem in literary criticism for
two thousand years. The exertions and requirements of moralizers never
diminish, and many a theorist becomes frankly ambivalent. Thus W. K. Wim-
satt, Jr. insists that he tends to side with those who would separate art
from morality; yet later he admits that, for him, the greatest poetry will
13)
not be immoral or indifferent, but "morally right." Perhaps such ambi-
valence cannot ever be eliminated.
Both art and morality have an ideal. . . but the
ideals are not the same. . . Morality aims at erad-
icating and abolishing evil..., whereas the aesthet-
ic contemplation of life recognizes [evil] as an
element necessary to vivid and full interest... I
do not think that this opposition can be altogether
14)overcome . -^ '
Elder Olson, the neo-Aristotelian critic, draws a distinct line be-
tween works of aesthetic beauty and works of rhetoric and didacticism -
the work of Homer as opposed to the work of Dante, "one... concerned with
beauty of form, and the other with the inculcation of doctrine." Al-
ready, the liberal reader should be uncomfortably wincing: are we to con-
cede, willy-nilly, that there is no "philosophy" in the pages of Homer?
no "aesthetic beauty" in the cantos of Dante? Somehow, such twin Pro-
crustean beds of art and ethics threaten ruthlessly to cleave, to curtail,
and to savage the writings of two of the world's major literary figures.
And indeed, the problem is more extensive and compromising even than
it first appears. For these are two age-old categories, distinguishing
works that strive to persuade an audience, seeking to influence its
thought or its action, juxtaposed with works that "nothing affirm,"
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imitations that strive to create a complete poetic whole, "a perfect pat-
tern.
"''^^ Such a distinction indicates, in effect, that rhetoric is a
"useful" art, while poetics or poesis is a "fine" art.
Useful art, employing nature's own machinery, aids
her in her effort to realize the ideal in the world
around us, so far as man's practical needs are served
by furthering this purpose. Fine art sets practical
needs aside; it does not seek to affect the real
world, to modify the actual. By mere imagery it re-
veals the ideal form at which nature aims in the high-
est sphere of organic existence, - in the region,
namely, of human life...-'-''
Or, according to the distinction more recently enlarged upon by Susanne
18
)
Langer, rhetoric is discursive; poetry, presentational. For rhetoric
is a means to creating "action" in the real world; whereas poetry is an
end in itself, the creating of a complete and imitative "action" - not in
the real world, but - in the world of art.
And yet, these two categories have been difficult to maintain in rig-
orous isolation. As Aristotle himself concedes, all men - artists among
them - employ rhetoric at all times:
. . . all men in some way partake of both [rhetoric and
dialectic]; for all men to some degree attempt to ex-
amine and to support an argument and to speak in de-
fense of it and to speak against it.^^^
In addition, boundaries between the two kinds - useful and fine art -
have continually been broken down, allowing and even encouraging the two
to become confused. It would prove foolhardy to insist that an artist in
his work overtly propound moral precepts ov , at the opposite extreme, scru-
pulously expunge every moral quality whatsoever from his work. The artist,
frankly, can satisfy neither of these immoderate ends. Typically, for in-
stance, Mark Twain, like many a first-rate author, perceived very clearly
the paradox that morality must never predominate in art, although such
morality must never be entirely absent: "humor must not professedly teach,
and it must not professedly preach," he writes, "but it must do both if
20)it would live forever.
Moreover, we should note that literary drama - even Senecan drama -is
by its very nature mimetic; yet many periods in history simply make no dis-
tinction between the mimetic and the didactic. Regardless of genre, atZ
eighteenth-century works of art, it has been pointed out, were to some
degree consciously directed to an audience: "... the poet's task, like
the orator's, was to arouse in his audience certain emotions about the
21)
subject of his poem."
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Indeed, conscious of the censures of Plato in the Republic, all liter-
ary criticism for some twenty-two hundred years tended to defend art by
proposing that it was always didactic. Horace in the Ars Poetioa affirms
that all poetry desires "aut pvodesse. . . out deleotare ," to teach or to
22)delight. Scaliger, in his Foetvoe (1561) , agrees "that the poet teach-
es moral habits through actions. 'Action is therefore a mode of teaching;
23)
and the moral habit is what we are taught to apply.'" Similarly, Sir
Philip Sidney's Apologie for Poetrie (1583) claims that poetry's end is
"to teach and delight," and that "Poetry ever setteth virtue... out in her
K ^ 1 ..24)best colours."
Furthermore, by a quirk of history, the analysis of poetry was cast
primarily into the hands of rhetoricians for some two millenia. It was
authors like Longinus and Cicero and Quintilian and their commentators who
influenced medieval and Renaissance thought. Only in the 1940 's and '50's
did the vogue of the New Criticism, focusing its attention upon the liter-
ary work itself, commence to distinguish once again, as Aristotle had done,
between works of didacticism and of aesthetic. But it has been by no
means a prevailing tradition.
What in our time has been labelled "the didactic
heresy" was the basic theory of literature for some
twenty-two centuries. Renaissance critics and poets
have little to say about self-expression or the ago-
nies of creation, but they are never weary of insist-
ing that literature is philosophy teaching by examples,
that it moves men to the love and practice of virtue
and the abhorrence of vice. Thus the aim of litera-
ture is identical with the aim of education, virtuous
action. 25)
In general, then, over the centuries moralism and didacticism in literary
criticism has tended to prevail. We might well answer critics' "discovery"
that Seneca is philosophizing and moralizing in his dramas by reminding
them that Sophoclean or Aeschylean or Euripidean drama is all too frequent-
ly comprehended in precisely the same instructional light.
Indeed, most dramatists in some sense employ ideas in their plays, and
this is particularly true of the ancient Greek playwrights. William Arrow-
smith, for example, has argued that both Aeschylus and Sophocles use their
contemporary cultural situation "as framing dramatic ideas" in their plays,
and he goes on to urge that Euripides especially was the experimentalist
who literally creates a theater of ideas. There was something of a hue
and cry when Eric Bentley's The Playwright as Thinker first appeared in
1946, but Bentley has stood by his general thesis: that the major drama-
tists of the modern era (Wagner, Ibsen, Strindberg, Shaw) have fostered
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ideas in their dramas
.
Yet the difficulties with a predominant didacticism should become ap-
parent. Far too frequently, for instance, in such a climate, the literary
work is yanked and pulled and distorted by allegorizing , in order to force
27)
it to yield up its acceptable modicum of lesson and message. At its
most silly, such message-monger ing leads a critic like Thomas Rymer to dis-
cern two "morals" in Shakespeare's Othello-.
... a caution to maidens of quality how, without
their parents' consent, they run away with black-
amoors... [and] a warning to all good wives that
they look well to their linen. ^8)
Still more importantly, a regnant moral didacticism is tempted to be-
come "militant," demanding that religious and philosophical instruction
in the literary work be made pikestaff clear and overt. At its worst,
such criticism is recurrently moved to advocate censorship (necessitating
just as repeatedly that authors counter with their Areopagitioas) . Such
rigid moralizing criticism commences by doubting whether good poetry can
29)
ever be written by "bad" men. Where it cannot censure, it attempts to
prescribe what sort of literature is "acceptable." Over the years, for
example, this practice led to the development of the concept of "poetic
justice" in the drama of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - that
doctrine which called overtly (as at the tacked-on conclusion of the Book
of Job) for the on-stage punishment of vice and the remuneration of rec-
titude (and may be perceived in the curious pabulum of Richard Steele's
sentimental plays or in Richardson's novel, Pamela or Virtue Rewarded
[1740]). By such a standard, only a limited number of "cheerful" plots
would be admissible. Tragedy would be virtually ham-strung (unless the
protagonist be vicious); satire would prove unruly (refusing in tone, word,
and deed to "suffer fools gladly"); and comedy would only be permitted to
trifle and jest at the expense of the morally reprehensible. Lest these
reflections seem extreme and at any rate unnecessary in our own enlighten-
ed era, let us remind the reader of the frequency with which Tennessee
Williams has been chastized for dwelling so frequently in his dramas upon
32)the unsavory and the depressing, and recollect as well Kenneth Tynan's
33)
strictures of Eugene lonesco's plays for failing to be "affirmative."
Such ethical vigilantes are ever upon the alert. Furthermore, it has be-
come commonplace in recent years for the occasional moralist to raise his
voice against our own period's literature for celebrating decadence, vio-
lence, pornography, obscenity, and vice - the most recent instance being
34)Mr. John Gardner's On Moral Fiction (1978).
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The truth of the matter is that we cannot, even if we wanted to, pre-
scribe what we will accept as suitable to world literature. In the epic,
in the novel, in much poetry, and especially in the drama - in all of these
fictional modes the author simply is not present in propria persona. Nor
will normative literary conventions allow him to break in upon the scene.
It is indeed true that readers of a particular cast of mind wish fully to
"know" what an author "means" by a certain character or a certain event.
(We constantly hope to learn to "know" as much about the perplexities and
incidents of life.) Yet it is virtually impossible for fictional genres
to satisfy this obsession fully to know. Given such a frustration, too
many readers (who after all do not wish to read fictions, but yearn in-
stead for lectures, editorials, and cablegrams) are tempted to discover
the author hidden beneath the mantle of one or another character within
the creative work, as if fictional portrayal were merely a game of hide-
and-seek. After such experiences, the bewildered author often has to
deliver, outside his fiction, something of a disclaimer: characters and
scenes, he might feel constrained to inform us, in his book are wholly
fictional, and any resemblance to actual places or persons - living or
dead - is strictly coincidental. Milton was once moved to explain him-
self in just this vein:
One is not to regard what the poet says, but what
person in the play speaks, and what that person says;
for different persons are introduced, sometimes good,
sometimes bad; sometimes wise men, sometimes fools;
and such words are put into their mouths, as it is
most proper for them to speak; not such as the poet
would speak, if he were to speak in his own person. -^^^
One need not be a demon to create the figure of Satan, a madman to devise
a Quixote, a fool to generate a Falstaff, a chatterbox or cynic to con-
ceive a Thersites - although many a reader has faltered in comprehending
that this is so. In opposition to such a view, which he designates "the
personal heresy," C. S. Lewis urges that such critics act as if all poetry
"must be the expression of [the poet's] personality," that such poetry "is
about the poet's state of mind." Critics, Lewis notes, are guilty of this
fallacy even when dealing with the drama, for their major premiss [is]
that the cynicism and disillusionment put into the mouths of some Skakes-
pearian characters are Shakespeare's." It is in this light that many
a critic comprehends Senecan drama - as exclusively the expression of
Seneca's own personality, of Seneca's own ideas.
In short, an author can never be assessed ethically by the numbers of
good or evil characters he invents; on the contrary, if the artist's
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vision of good and of evil is overwhelming, that is merely a testimonial
to his creative force, and not at all an indicator of the level of his
immaculateness or the certification of his creed. Yet the characters an
author creates can hardly be judged without taking morality into account.
In Aristotle's words, for instance,
... tragedy is... an imitation of... action, of
life, of happiness and unhappiness. . . and the end
is a certain action, not a quality; men are what
they are as a result of their character, they are
happy or unhappy as a result of their actions.-^''
Whenever a fictional creation makes a choice of speech or action, he re-
veals (as do people in life) his moral character. He cannot help it; his
actions bespeak his morality - and any behavior is in some sense moral.
Henry James once entirely dismissed a critical squabble that sought to
distinguish two literary kinds: novels of character and novels of inci-
dent.
There is an old-fashioned distinction between the
novel of character and the novel of incident...
It appears to me... little to the point... There
are bad novels and good novels , as there are bad
pictures and good pictures; but that is the only
distinction in which I see any meaning, and I can
as little imagine speaking of a novel of character
as I can imagine speaking of a picture of character.
When one says picture, one says character, when one
says novel, one says incident, and the terms may be
transposed at will. What is character but the de-
termination of incident? What is either a picture
or a novel that is not of character? What else do
we seek in it and find in it? It is an incident
for a woman to stand up with her hand resting on a
table and look out at you in a certain way; or if
it be not an incident I think it will be hard to say
what it is. At the same time it is an expression of
character . ^°'
Hence, an author may well brilliantly express action and character in
literary works of art, but he cannot express himself; he cannot express
his morality or his philosophy. We obtain only a hint of these latter by
the breadth, the particularity, the assurance, and the intensity of his
creativity. We cannot be certain of the discursive meaning of Seneca's
plays (we cannot be certain of such meaning of any plays - and debates
over interpretations of Hamlet and the Oedipus Tyrannos are relevant here)
,
but we can indeed be certain of the force and intensity of much of Sene-
ca's achievement - the gloomy atmosphere of the Oedipus, the furious
ragings of a Medea, an Atreus , or a Juno, the witty asperity of a Megara's
rejoinders to the tyrant Lycus , the frustrated clairvoyance of a Cassandra,
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the desperate sufferings of the mother Andromache, the poisoned physical
torments of a Hercules, the insane loves of a Phaedra. We cannot in all
honesty label these works "pseudotragedies" or thank our stars that they
are without aesthetic interest - lest with the art we toss out the arti-
fact, and there be nothing left!
If we set aside hypotheses about instruction and philoso-
phizing for a time and examine squarely into Seneca's plays,
we ought to discern those features that lend them psychic
power and dramatic force. For one thing, his plays are aus-
tere etchings and rich mood-pieces, as Herington has observed.
Herington stresses in Seneca a tone of "almost religious fer-
vor" and a "terrible moral sensitivity" realized by the play-
wright's "concrete, pictorial imagination" and brilliant
39
)
painter's eye for "fantasy." Prescient choruses keen and
brood, and grotesque images recur with a fatal insistence.
Such features lend an intensity to scenes of suffering, as
40
)
Regenbogen has particularly remarked and astutely explored.
Further, of course, such settings and distorting scenes sug-
gest the nightmarish, almost hallucinatory visions that be-
speak a lurid and perceptive psychological presentation
presentation enhanced by his characters' soliloquies, dramat-
41)ic laments, and "self-apostrophes."
To add to this psychiatric milieu, characters speak with
stichomythic and almost shot-gun tenseness and unreal clarity,
as violent emotions build. Moreover, scenes tend to be iso-
lated, blocked off, separate - even disjunct. Jo-Ann Shelton
speaks of temporal repetitions in the Hercules Furens and the
Thyestes and of the playwright's presentation of "simultaneous e-
42)
vents linearly;" but what is achieved is a staccato-effect
inthe dreamlike tracing not of clock but of psychic time. For
example, in the Thyestes when Tantalus curses the House of
Atreus, characters in the play are already infected, and subse-
quently edged and jarred and caromed onward into a mainstream
of emotional fever pitch and taut melodramtic posturing and
performance. Needless to say, such a psychological theater
of extremity and cruelty was particularly attractive to Eliz-
abethans and Jacobeans . As Michael Higgins notes,
. .
.
the Stoic revival of the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries was a symptom of a general dis-
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solution of established beliefs and institutions.
This atmosphere of chaos, of moral and intellectual
disintegration, is reflected in the tragedies of the
Jacobean era.'*-^'
Seneca's theater clearly reflected crises of a mass urban
society and of the rising dictatorships of first-century
Rome. The Neronian world of chaos, foreboding, fantasy, and
44)
the grotesque are perhaps best exemplified in his Oedipus.
Moreover, such characteristics are again in the twentieth cen-
tury a particularly relevant dramatic form of art.
Seneca's influential, psychologically charged, and violent-
ly emotional theater is hardly tragic or cathartic in the tra-
ditional Aristotelian sense - characters in his plays are too
frenzied and furious in their violence and obsessions; and a
suppurating flux of evil prevails. As the Chorus in the
Phaedra (978-82) gloomily intones:
Fortune in disarray governs human affairs
and blindly scatters her gifts,
favoring the foul;
dreadful lust conquers blameless men,
fraud in the lofty palace prevails.
Nor is Fortuna even so innocently blind; for spirits like Tan-
talus and deities like Juno actually intrude in behalf of
savagery and mayhem. But, most importantly, despite all of
the fury and destruction, Senecan drama is pervaded by a large
and persistent irony. Vice triumphs - but is never gratified.
Phaedra's revenge, after all, includes her own destruction and
the slaughter of her beloved Hippolytus. Medea's righting of
the balance betwixt herself and Jason includes the murder of
her own children; her final claim that she has been restored
to chastity and innocence is perceived as being outrageously
45
)
and pathetically deluded. Atreus , for all of his towering
fury, continues frustrated and insecure even at the moment of
his most horrible victory over Thyestes: his jealousy, suspi-
cion, and ire are pitched at such an extremity that they can
46)
never be satisfied or allayed. Similarly, in a broad his-
torical sense, Clytemnestra ' s and Aegisthus' vengeance upon
Agamemnon is but the helpless accomplishment of recompense to
Cassandra and the dead of Troy; and, to be sure, the play con-
cludes with no resolution or pause in the train of crimes and
reprisals, and the mad Cassandra has the last prophetic word
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with Agamemnon's assassins: "veniet et vobis furor" (1012) - upon
the destroyers shall mad destruction be yet to descend. Even
beyond the human realm, the spirits of Thyestes and Achilles,
the shade of Tantalus, cry for cruelty and vengeance. Even
the deity Juno is rabidly incensed. Whether among humans,
among spirits, or among the gods themselves, Senecan theater
merely presents a brutal ethos of continual slaughter. His
pervasive, secular irony merely attests to the ignobility of
gods and heroes alike that borders upon - nay, that topples
over into - insanity. Ultimately, such characters stand re-
vealed as puppets in the universe, for their freedom and self-
realization and self-expression has been totally lost to mania
and passion.
It is erroneous to argue that Seneca composed such intense,
original, and powerful dramatic visions merely to inculcate
philosophic thought. Yet, to be sure, such thought abounds
in his plays. Needless to say, all major literary works that
have been presumably admired are replete with intellectual
content. A true classic is remembered for its distinction in
content as well as in form. It is virtually impossible to
insist that Seneca wrote these tragedies merely to formulate
a syllogism or a maxim. He is rather endowing us with a po-
etic, creative, new tragic invention - one that envisions a
livid, ruinous world where evil characters rant and rave,
perpetrating the destruction of themselves and of others. His
brilliantly darkened world-picture can hardly be reduced or
construed as torts and orts of instruction for little Marcus-
es and Juliuses. Rather he has created for us an unreasoning
universe, a second world closely set beside our own, a night-
mare neighborhood where passion and frenzy are forever in
fullest flower. If he touches us profoundly, it is because
his neighborhood, after all, is dangerously near to our own.
Such is his gift to us of a genuine literature.
"what?" we might question: "Seneca a maker of 'literature'?" It is
quite true that Seneca, in his philosophical writings, appears to give
pure literature a second-row seat. The Stoics naturally placed philos-
ophy above the other "arts"; thus Seneca claims philosophy is the only
art that investigates good and evil and contributes to the perfection of
47)
the soul. Yet we know of his impressive familiarity with Ovid, Homer,
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48)
and Vergil from the great number of times he mentions or quotes from them.
As he makes clear in one passage, it is not so much that he ignores liter-
ature, as that he approaches it - not as the philologist or the grammarian
49)
- but as the philosopher; his chief concern is how to live and how to
die, how to obtain strength to practice virtue, to strive for intellectual
perfections, and to be borne, as it were, aloft toward the gods. Seneca
knew that outstanding literary achievement, whatever its genre, guaranteed
for the writer immortal glory. At one point he quotes from Vergil: Optima
. 50)
quaeque dies misevis mortalibus aevi/ prima fugtt (For wretched mortals,
the best days of life are the first to flee) . Overcome with emotion and
response to the poet's painful insight, Seneca observes: Clamat eoae maxi-
mus vates et vetut divino ore instinatus salutare carmen oanit. (Behold
the greatest bard exclaims and as if inspired with divine words sings a
salutary song.) In his studies, Seneca regularly honors the great minds
of every genre, the grand geniuses of every age: ... sed own optima quo-
que sum; ad illos , in quooumque loco, in quoaumque saeoulo fuerunt, ani-
52)
mum meum mitto. (... but I am with all the best; to them, xn whatever
place, in whatever century they have been, I send my own soul.) And he,
like them, escaped the oblivion of time, not only through his philosophic
Letters and Dialogues but through his Tragedies as well.
University of South Florida
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